I’m publishing a short series of posts as the definitive word on tackling the root cause of the failures of humanitarian and development practitioners to reconcile, resolve and otherwise deal with their differences in approach. There is certainly much more that can be said, and probably volumes that can and will be written, but it will all be wrong.
Let us recap.
In part one of this series, we established that the abject failure of economists, anthropologists, sociologists, ethnologists, political scientists, engineers and every stripe of sun-weathered dusty-booted aidworker to resolve the yawning chasm between relief and development into a Grand Unified Theory of aid, is down to the fact that Disaster Risk Reduction advisors and practitioners are some of the most miserable buggers to walk the planet.
In part two, we empirically established that it is nevertheless possible to be wildly successful by making beautiful noises about miserable buggers.
And so now we turn to part three, the conclusion of this series: shocking conclusions.